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But first, a word! Till now I’ve had no direction,
When old or young teased me with a question.
For example: no one’s found out, ever,
What makes body and soul fit together:
Stick tight, as if there’ll be no separation,
Yet always cause each other irritation
(Goethe 2003, 6892–6896).
Abstract. In the article author analyses the extent to which it is possible to regard the 
Aristotelian conception of the soul as actually necessary and applicable for modern 
neuroscience. The framework in which this objective is going to be accomplished is 
provided by the idea of the coexistence of the “manifest” and “scientific” images of the 
world and persons, as introduced by Wilfrid Sellars. In subsequent sections, author ini-
tially formulates an answer to the questions of what it is that Aristotle sought to explain 
with his conception of soul as formal cause, and how this notion could be portrayed in 
terms drawn from contemporary neurological science. It is author’s intention to show 
that no other concepts—be they the Cartesian “mind” or a Chalmers-style “self”—come 
anywhere close to matching the breadth of scope of Aristotelian “soul”. At the same 
time, though, analysis carried out here do not intend to undertake any kind of defence 
of the soul as a spiritual entity of the sort popular where religious faith is concerned, 
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namely as an entity separable from the body, immortal, and inimitably tied to God. Then, 
in the second major part of the article, author analyses the extent to which the Aris-
totelian conception of the soul can be thought of as involving criteria of the sort that 
we encounter in the contemporary theory of strong emergence. According to the author 
the theory of strong emergence has, as a heuristic theory, quite general predictive and 
explanatory power as regards the field of human thought and behaviour. 
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Introduction
Modern philosophy and science, especially in their more recent and con-
temporary forms, have proved somewhat ungracious where the soul is 
concerned. On the one hand, in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition 
we may observe an increasing tendency—beginning with Locke, Hobbes and 
Hume—to subordinate the mental (the mind) to the physical (the brain). 
On the other, we may also note that the Cartesian dualist conception of 
minds and mechanical bodies brought with it a reduction of the Aristotelian 
biological conception of soul (as a principle of living beings constitutive 
of the very form of the body) to the idea of the thinking soul. According to 
this reduction, our understanding of the living organism is to be modelled 
on that of dead bodies. The response to Descartes’ ontological construal of 
the res cogitans was such as to engender the body-mind problem—one that 
remains unresolved today; however, it also lent support to dualism, which 
has come to be regarded as a theory that is scientifically hopeless: the study 
of life pursued in the expanding fields of biological and neuroscientific 
research is not permitted to involve any metaphysical objects unverifiable 
through empirical research or analysis. The vehemence of the dispute about 
vitalism, which—in terms similar to those of the mechanics of fundamental 
forces—postulates an independent species of living power, bears witness 
to this Cartesian mode of thinking.
At the same time, we are entitled to ask the following question: had 
the soul been understood in accordance with Aristotelian rather than the 
Cartesian notions, would contemporary philosophy and science now be more 
accommodating in their attitudes towards it? Taking the example of biology, 
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we may then assert that as a science it should first constitute itself in a quite 
new way, as something distinct from physics—by making clear that living 
bodies cannot be understood solely on the basis of the model furnished 
by dead corpses. Indeed, discussions concerning the epistemological and 
ontological characteristics of living versus dead bodies continue to be 
pursued with vigour, especially in relation to the position that holds that 
even in the absence of any living power, the biological regularities involved 
cannot be wholly reduced to physical ones (cf. Krohs and Töpfer 2005).
It seems that commentators do occasionally feel compelled either to 
couch our current philosophical or scientific explanations in terms drawn 
from Aristotle’s ideas about explanation, or to read Aristotle as anticipat-
ing present theories in these or other fields. We hear, for instance, such 
expressions as “an Aristotle for the age of neuroscience”, and, at the same 
time, encounter talk of the soul conducted in pretty similar terms—seeking, 
in effect, to secure a place for Aristotelian concepts in our contemporary 
understanding on the basis of how they show up in contexts furnished by 
modern scientific approaches themselves (cf. Goodman and Caramenico 
2010).
The goal of the present article is to analyse the extent to which it is 
possible to regard the Aristotelian conception of the soul as actually neces-
sary for modern neuroscience. The framework in which I aim to accomplish 
this will be provided by the idea of the coexistence of the “manifest” and 
“scientific” images of the world and persons, as introduced by Wilfrid Sellars. 
In subsequent sections, I shall initially formulate an answer to the questions 
of what it is that Aristotle sought to explain with his conception of soul 
as formal cause, and how this notion could be portrayed in terms drawn 
from contemporary neurological science. I expect to show that no other 
concepts—be they the Cartesian “mind” or a Chalmers-style “self”—come 
anywhere close to matching the breadth of scope of Aristotelian “soul”. 
At the same time, though, I do not intend to undertake any kind of defence 
of the soul as a spiritual entity of the sort popular where religious faith is 
concerned—as separable from the body, immortal, and inimitably tied to God. 
Then, in the second major part of the article, I shall analyse the extent to 
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which the Aristotelian conception of the soul can be thought of as involving 
criteria of the sort that we encounter in the contemporary theory of strong 
emergence (construing the latter as essentially a heuristically validated 
theory, whose purpose is to stimulate further investigation for the sake of 
empirically based theorizing.) 
1. Aristotle as a philosopher of the manifest image  
of the world
In his article “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man”, Sellars intro-
duced his telling description of the “manifest” and “scientific” images, 
together with some compelling ideas about the relationship between them 
and what expectations we might have for their reconciliation. Along with 
this account, he introduced a particular kind of opposition between two 
conceptions of ourselves and our place in the world.
Taking Sellars’ concept of the manifest image as our first point of 
departure permits us to initially state that a human person is not to be 
thought of as a Cartesian mind, but rather as a living organism under-
stood in Aristotelian hylomorphic terms. Sellars himself says that “[t]he 
Aristotelian-Strawsonian reconstruction is along sounder lines” (Sellars 
1974, 240), and indeed, it does seem better suited to capturing the crucial 
structural features of our manifest-image conception of persons. According 
to him, Strawson achieved a kind of assimilation of the Aristotelian reality 
of persons within the terms of our contemporary philosophical discourse 
(cf.: Sellars 1992, 170–171; Rosenberg and Sellars 2007, 13; Bremer 2007, 
9–20). Aristotelian persons, as described in Aristotle’s “On the Soul”, 
and Strawsonian persons as outlined in “Individuals”, are more or less 
homogenous.1 They consist of multi-layered properties, but they do not 
correspond to the dualists’ idea of a body-mind tandem as exemplified in 
1 Therefore, what is primitive (original) is not the concept of a mind, but that of a person: 
“What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that ‘both’ 
predicates ascribing states of consciousness ‘and’ predicates ascribing corporeal charac-
teristics, a physical situation, etc., are equally applicable to a single individual of that 
single type” (Strawson 1959, 101–102).
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the Cartesian conception of the person. It is the same person who thinks 
and who moves. According to the manifest image, persons are fundamental, 
single individuals. They were a universal category of the Sellarsian (primitive) 
“original image”, about which “[t]he truth is, rather, that originally to be 
a tree was a way of being a person” (Sellars 1963, 10, cf. 7–8). When, in the 
original manifest image, man ceased to think of what we call trees as persons, 
this change was more radical than a change in belief: it was a change in 
categorical understanding.
It is the manifest image that has determined “the framework in terms 
of which man came to be aware of himself as man-in-the-world” (Ibid., 40). 
In this sense, the primary objects of the manifest image are persons, who 
reflectively understand themselves as being in the world both as thinkers 
and as agents. In terms of the manifest image, persons are capable of feeling 
and perceiving, they are cognitive knowers of the world, they are agents 
able to affect their—social and natural—surroundings through deliberate 
and rational forms of elective behaviour. Explanations, we might add, when 
given in the context of the manifest image, usually follow the model of 
Mill’s inductive approach.
The “scientific image”, by comparison, is a complex projection of man-
-in-the-world and human understanding. It emerges with the ongoing 
findings resulting from theoretical explanation and reasoning. In particular, 
it benefits from those approaches that involve postulatory forms of theory 
construction. The scientific image is, admittedly, methodologically depend-
ent on the categories of the manifest world, but
it purports to be a complete image, i.e., to define a framework which could be the 
whole truth about that which belongs to the image. Thus although methodolog-
ically a development within the manifest image, the scientific image presents 
itself as a rival image. From its point of view the manifest image on which it rests 
is an “inadequate” but pragmatically useful likeness of a reality which first finds 
its adequate (in principle) likeness in the scientific image (Sellars 1963, 20).2
2 In what I consider to have been a highly inspiring discussion that took place during the 
International Workshop “Soul or Brain: What Makes Us Human” (Toruń, 2016), the ques-
tion arose of whether the solution to the body-mind problem proposed by Peter Hacker 
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The scientific image of man-in-the-world is multidisciplinary. It is partially 
elaborated by neuroscience. A person is seen as composed from sub-personal 
parts, consisting of a great many billions of neurons connected by many 
trillions of synapses—a brain that itself has no indication of what is going 
on amongst those synapses. There are several possibilities for how we should 
understand the connection between the manifest-image and scientific-image 
concepts of a person. In manifest-image terms, I or he/she is (a) either 
ontologically or epistemologically reducible to the brain, or (b) strictly 
correlated with the brain, or (c) separated from it. But which of these ways 
of understanding a person, if any, entails an adequate reconciling of the 
subpersonal entities involved with the manifest image of the conscious me 
as me—caught up in my particular life, recalling it, planning for it? How can 
the view from the neurological stage be reconciled with the one that shows 
could be adapted, together with Bennett and Hacker’s critique of the so called “mereo-
logical fallacy” (i.e., the inclination to attribute to the brain mental concepts that only 
make sense when attributed to the whole person). (See: Hacker and Bennett 2003). Ben-
nett is a neuroscientist, while Hacker is a philosopher, known primarily for his commen-
tary on the later philosophy of Wittgenstein. In Hacker’s view, philosophy is an a priori 
discipline, in that its assertions or statements are conceptually true (Hacker and Ben-
nett 2003, 3, 6, 318). But what does “conceptual true” actually mean? In the context of 
a conjunction of philosophy with science, the distinction between a priori and a poste-
riori surely needs to be supplemented by the analytic-synthetic distinction. A synthetic 
statement is one whose truth is determined partially by the meanings of the terms used, 
and partially by the reality of how things stand in the world. The abovementioned book, 
moreover, presents a very limited perspective on philosophy. A more revealing title for it 
would have been “A Wittgensteinian Approach to the Conceptual Elements of Cognitive 
Neuroscience”. Philosophy, to my mind (and also in line with Sellars), is to be more broad-
ly conceived than just what we find in late-Wittgensteinian philosophical approaches to 
(ordinary) language construed in manifest-image terms. Hacker and Bennett argue that 
just about everybody in cognitive neuroscience is guilty of committing a rather simple 
conceptual “mereological fallacy”. But are they offering any alternative that might be of 
benefit to the neurosciences? Are they presenting any positive theory or model, such as 
would shed light on how such neuroscientific theories or models might be structured? For 
example, their reports about commissurotomy (Sperry, Gazzaniga), correct as they may 
be, essentially just consist of an accumulation of redescriptions of accessible, manifest 
phenomena: they are not explanations at all. Hacker and Bennett are surely right: these 
phenomena occur under conditions that are far from ordinary. But how are we to explain 
them? Is it sufficient—within the terms of the scientific image as we understand it today—
to declare, along with Wittgenstein, that “[e]xplanations come to an end somewhere”? 
(Wittgenstein 1953, §1). 
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up as true at the level of the manifest image, and which says that at some 
point our brains must be correlated with our own thinking about ourselves 
and about things? Could the latter’s aboutness be simply determined by 
what goes on in and amongst that huge cluster of neurons and synapses?
Sellars requires that we seek an answer to several questions. Is it possible 
to reconcile these two images of a person? Could manifest-image persons 
be reduced to such systems of scientifically postulated objects as groups 
of neurons? Are manifest-image persons ultimately real, and scientific 
entities merely abstract, in the sense of being posited constructs valued 
only for their role in the prediction, explanation and control of actually 
perceived manifest-image persons and objects? Or are manifest-image 
objects appearances to human minds of a reality constituted by systems 
of imperceptible particles? Sellars himself opts for a Kantian approach: 
the manifest image is the phenomenal realm, whereas science reveals 
things as they are in themselves. On the one hand, admittedly, he speaks 
of “the primacy of the scientific image” (Sellars 1963, 32), but on the 
other, he embraces in the end the argument for a “synoptic vision” (Ibid., 
40), according to which the descriptive and explanatory capacities of the 
scientific image are united with the social language of the community and 
with our individual intentions. That language “provide[s] the ambience of 
principles and standards (above all, those which make meaningful discourse 
and rationality itself possible) within which we live our own individual lives” 
(Ibid.). And this discursive framework, according to Sellars, does not need 
to be reconciled with the scientific image, but rather could just be “joined 
to it” (Ibid.; cf. Hodgson 2012, 47, 54).
In the context of some more detailed considerations, Sellars considers 
and rejects Descartes’ attempt to integrate the manifest and scientific 
images (cf. Sellars 1963, 25–31). On the one hand, on Sellars’ reading, 
Descartes denied that there were brain states which were, in the same 
sense, the cerebral counterparts of conceptual thinking, while on the 
other he stated that we know what thinking is without conceiving of it 
as a complex neurophysiological process, from which it follows that it 
cannot itself be a complex physiological process. As Sellars himself notes, 
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at the time of Descartes, theoretical science had obviously not arrived yet 
at the neurophysiological level of inquiry—except in the form of a clumsy 
promissory note. 
2. Aristotle on types of causes
Sellars recognises the extent to which Aristotle’s hylomorphic metaphysics 
represents a forceful interpretation of the fundamental logic and science 
of the manifest image: “It should be clear that I regard Aristotle as the phi-
losopher of the Manifest Image” (Sellars 1975, 303). According to Aristotle, 
“science” means “causal knowledge”: in other words, knowledge about what 
causes are is crucial for every form of science. We only have knowledge of 
something when we have understood its causes.
Since we think that we understand something when we know its explanation, 
and there are four sorts of explanation (one, what it is to be something; one, 
that if certain items hold it is necessary for this to hold; another, what initiated 
the change; and fourth, the purpose), all of them are proved through the middle 
term (Aristotle 1993, 94a20).
This might be summarized as follows: in the framework of the manifest 
image we demand to know the essence (the “suchness”), the necessary 
conditions, the (efficient) cause, and the purpose. In this sense, Aristotle’s 
“causes” are often better thought of as “explanations” or “reasons”. In his 
Metaphysics, Aristotle refers us to an artist’s or a craftsman’s work to describe 
the four types of causation that form the basis of the natural world of the 
manifest image.
The material cause is “that out of which” the object (statue) is made, 
the efficient cause is the source of the object’s principle of change or 
stability, the formal cause is the essence of the object, and the final cause 
is the goal/end of the object, or what the object is good for (cf. Bremer 2015, 
101–102). Matter of some kind or other (e.g., gold) has the potential (based 
on its “plasticity”) to be actualized (thus “formed”, “organized”) by form in 
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different ways. Aristotle also saw a correlation between formal causation 
and personal causation (on the part of an agent or soul):
The mover or agent will always be the vehicle of a form, either a ‘this’ or ‘such’, 
which, when it acts, will be the source and cause of the change, e.g. the full-
formed man begets man from what is potentially man (Aristotle 2009, 202a9–11).
Likewise, Phidias the sculptor is the agent cause who arranges some part of 
the available gold for the purpose of creating the colossal sacred statue of 
Athena Parthenos. This means that agent causes can be construed in three 
different senses: as efficient, formal or final causes, which often coincide 
when we think about the nature of agent causation. The final cause is not 
principally a causative, but rather an influential cause, because it is only 
through its having been imagined by Phidias that it has played its role in 
the genesis of the statue. However, we can still reduce this mental goal to 
a causative one, if we reflect on the counterfactual consideration that had 
the artist not thought of and intended some image, he probably would not 
have become involved in executing the various movements that he did in 
fact perform. Moreover, if his movements had been wholly arbitrary, they 
definitely would not have resulted in such a perfect resemblance of Athena. 
Thus we have here a kind of partial causation. In the example we have given, 
the formal and final causes are identical: a certain shape resembling that 
of Athena. At the same time, Sellars reminds us that
neither Aristotle nor the Scholastics conceived of soul and body as two changing, 
interacting substances, as did Plato and Descartes. The Aristotelians define the 
human soul as the substantial form of the human individual, who consists of 
matter and form as does any terrestrial substance. With qualifications which 
will be introduced at the proper place, it is the human individual that acts, that 
does things, and not the soul; just as it is water that freezes, and not the nature 
of water (Sellars 1949, 558–559).
Souls really exist, but in this broadly outlined Aristotelian sense, not 
a Platonic or Cartesian one. They possess reality at a different level from that 
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of any material or spiritual stuff. The reality of souls is properly captured 
by the concepts of form and formal causation, and these concepts need to 
be accommodated—in some reasonable way—within the scientific image 
of persons.
The individual agent mentioned above issues from a hierarchically 
organized biological system, exhibits causal powers, and counts as a fun-
damental entity in its own right. “What is ensouled is distinguished from 
what is not ensouled by living” (Aristotle 1986, 413a22).
The formal causation that figures in the soul’s relation to the living body 
is a species of something metaphysically fundamental, rather than just some 
sort of efficient causation. In this sense, the soul acts on the body merely in 
a mediated way, using bodily parts. No direct causation from soul to body 
is required, and this in turn means that there also need not to be either any 
new fundamental force involved, or any threat to the preservation of causal 
laws. The nomological integrity of the microphysical (or neurological) level 
in no way jeopardizes the real and irreducible power of the whole organism, 
as Aristotle’s hylomorphic approach involves no assumption to the effect 
that the microphysical facts are somehow elementary and unfounded. It 
is the form (soul) that is (partially) accountable for the relative places and 
trajectories of the microphysical parts. Any laws instantiated at a micro-
physical level assume, as inputs, something already existing within the 
context of the nature of the whole living, rational, individual human person. 
3. Aristotle’s soul and strong emergence
The Aristotelian concept of “form” (i.e., morphê, meaning a cause which is 
not itself a material part of the body, but is active in its development and 
determines its principal features) is in fact directly related to the modern, 
scientific conception of “information” as something transmitted across 
generations (cf. Deacon and Koutroufinis 2014, 404). The living body is 
a specific kind of “in-formed” matter. Even the teleological perspective of 
Aristotelian physics, which seemed to have been decisively eliminated by 
the mechanistic paradigm of Cartesian and Newtonian approaches, has 
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been partly rehabilitated by present-day biologists and economists, and has 
come to be employed as a basis for a new ecological ethics and economics.3
Does any information present in matter serve to bring about the emer-
gence of the individual agent or subject? Aristotle would say that information 
in a biological system should be regarded as furnishing an additional 
constraint on a theory of the emergent acting subject. Such a subject is 
“produced by” (generated by) a hierarchically organized biological system, 
exercises causal powers, and counts as a fundamental entity in its own 
right. “What is ensouled is distinguished from what is not ensouled by 
living” (Aristotle 1986, 413a22). And the “whole” is “something over and 
above its parts, and not just the sum of them all” (Aristotle 2017, 1045: 
8–10). A decisive consequence of this point is that the effects produced by 
“wholes” offer an unambiguous answer to the charge that wholes are solely 
“epiphenomena”: i.e., that they are nothing more than an expression of 
their parts, without any causal efficacy. Briefly, a whole exists when it acts 
like a whole, when it produces (generates) combined effects that the parts 
cannot produce (generate) by themselves.
Souls are introduced by Aristotle as a kind of explanatory posit in the 
context of the manifest image of the world. First of all they explain the fact 
that some beings are alive (vegetative, sensitive, and rational) and others 
are not. At the same time, he puts the explanatory focus on the type(s) of 
soul that an organism possesses, insisting that plants have a vegetative soul 
(explaining reproduction and growth), animals a vegetative and sensitive 
one (explaining mobility and sensation), and humans one with three powers, 
in that it is vegetative, sensitive and rational (able to think and reflect).
Thus, all of the activities of the organism are to be explained by means 
of the functions of its soul.
The soul is the cause or source of the living body. The terms cause and source 
have many senses. But the soul is the cause of its body alike in all three senses 
3 The Indian economist and philosopher, Amartya Sen, for example, invokes Aristotle as 
one of the sources for his ideas (Sen 2000, 289).
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which we explicitly recognize. It is (a) the source or origin of movement, it is (b) 
the end, it is (c) the essence of the whole living body (Aristotle 1986, 415b10).
Soul is real (i.e., it can act), though not as much so as an independent, 
separable entity. The representative active constituent of reality—that which 
is disposed to exhibit causal efficacy in respect of the surrounding world—is 
the soul-body whole that is an individual person (the man). Aristotle rejects 
the idea that the soul is the subject of psychic properties:
Yet to say that it is the soul which is angry is as inexact as it would be to say that 
it is the soul that weaves webs or builds houses. It is doubtless better to avoid 
saying that the soul pities or learns or thinks and rather to say that it is the 
man who does this with his soul (Witt 1992, 180; cf. Aristotle 1986, 408b12–13).
Aristotle avoids here the mereological fallacy of ascribing to parts attributes 
that can only intelligibly be ascribed to the wholes to which those parts 
belong. He argues for a sort of holism rather than dualism, as something 
entailed by the concept of the soul as the principle of realisation of the 
living body. Soul is not only the organized and functioning whole, but also 
its directing part.
Ipso facto—unlike in the case of Descartes—conceived in Aristotelian 
terms, animals’ bodies, and human bodies inasmuch as they are similar 
to them, cannot in principle be explained in purely mechanical terms. 
Descartes supposed that the nervous system functions like a complex 
hydraulic machine. Because the structure of our body and the patterns of 
our behaviour are similar to the structure and behaviour of some animals, 
it seemed obvious that many of our actions could also be amenable to an 
underlying mechanistic explanation (cf. Bremer 2014, 7–26).
Pursuing Descartes’ approach to the scientific image of the person, along 
with the various explanations of the mind-body problem proposed in the 
context of this, has the consequence that we find ourselves confronted with 
strictly reductionist theories, along with dualists and non-reductionists 
(cf. Bremer 2010). We may nevertheless wonder whether there is a sense in 
which Aristotle’s manifest-image account of explanation could be shown 
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to link up with contemporary approaches to explanation of the sort en-
countered in attempts to determine the scientific image of the world and 
of persons—e.g., where the latter’s thoughts and actions are concerned? 
Could the abovementioned internal features of Aristotle’s theory of soul, 
and its understanding of it as emergent in the sense of being “produced 
by the whole”, just amount to some sort of contemporary notion of weak 
emergence? According to David Chalmers: 
A high-level phenomenon is weakly emergent with respect to a low-level domain 
when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths 
concerning that phenomenon are unexpected given the principles governing 
the low-level domain. Weak emergence is the notion of emergence that is most 
common in recent scientific discussions. A high-level phenomenon is strongly 
emergent with respect to a low-level domain when the high-level phenomenon 
arises from the low-level domain, but truths concerning that phenomenon are 
not deducible even in principle from truths in the low-level domain … I think 
there is exactly one clear case of a strongly emergent phenomenon, and that is 
the phenomenon of consciousness (Chalmers 2006, 244).
The concept of weak emergence used in the case of soul-body causation 
implies that the causal powers of the soul are fully explainable in terms of 
their being related to the causal powers of the body or its parts (cf. Bremer 
2005, 138–139). Strictly speaking, weak emergence relates to unpredictable 
higher-level states that are ontologically reducible to lower-level states. 
The ability to reduce higher-level states to their lower-level constituents 
is useful for setting up a mechanistic explanation of emergent features. 
Consequently, weak emergence equates with a materialist kind of causal 
reduction. Such emergence brings entails physical monism: all elements 
in our manifest world consist solely of physical parts that exist in the 
scientifically grasped world.
Nevertheless, Aristotle is not in fact a materialist reductionist when it 
comes to the causal powers of the soul. According to him, an exhaustive 
description and explanation of the soul-body interaction requires not 
only material causation, but also the other three types of causation. He 
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understands soul—in living organisms—as the ontological foundation of 
efficient, final and formal causation. He realizes that each living thing has 
just one soul, the actions of which indicate some degree of nutritive, sensitive 
and (in humans) rational functioning. This soul is the formal, efficient and 
final cause of the survival of the organism. Only its material cause resides 
entirely in the body.
Souls are emergent forms of biological organisation, in a sense that 
denotes “all that makes person as such distinctive—our cognitive and 
emotive, active and creative, appetitive and moral capabilities” (Goodman 
and Caramenico 2010, 4).4 Aristotelian soul is the name for the integrating, 
organizing capabilities of sentient, sapient and agential personhood. 
The emergent person (i.e., the rational, voluntary soul) is an efficient, 
final and formal cause that is empowered to affect the matter that produces 
it. Ipso facto Aristotle is obliged to assume downward causation, and in 
consequence of this is committed to a strong kind of emergence. Strong 
emergence has two characteristics: the novelty of the emergent features 
entails their irreducibility, and they are able to exert downward (“top-
down”) causation. Mental states thus have genuinely new causal powers of 
their own, irreducible to those of the neurological states from which they 
themselves emerged.
As we will see, one type of irreducibility seems to imply downward causation 
while the other seems to imply epiphenomenalism. The failure to keep apart the 
two kinds of irreducibility has muddled the recent debate about the emergence 
of properties (Stephan 2002, 86).5
Generally, we may say that a systemic property P (e.g., a mental property) 
of a system S is irreducible, if it does not follow (even in principle) from 
the behaviour of the system’s parts that S has P. Understood this way, 
the Aristotelian thesis is in line with the contemporary notion of strong 
emergence, which, according to Stephan, means that
4 We do not follow the authors in their deliberations about the transcendent dimension of 
the soul (Goodman and Caramenico 2010, 243).
5 But see also: Kim 2006, 195–196.
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[w]ithin the physical domain, we would just have to accept additional types of 
causal influences besides the already known basal types of mutual interactions 
(Stephan 2002, 89).
The Aristotelian thesis thus requires that we invoke the criteria for strong 
emergence, and ipso facto entails a broader ontology than physical monism: 
(a) the acting soul is generated by the brain without being reducible to 
it, because of the unity of its mental experiences, and (b) the acting soul 
possesses, qua formal cause, the power to affect (i.e., organize) a person’s 
brain, thanks to the latter’s neuroplasticity. In the subsequent sections of 
this article we shall discuss these two specific points. 
3.1. The acting individuum: the unity of emergent properties
Along with mental properties located in specialized areas distributed across 
the brain, a special kind of entity also emerges: the individual and irreducibly 
singular individuum, equivalent to the Aristotelian agent. In his terms, this 
is what would be called the “active intellect”. Such an individuum possesses 
its mental properties in a unified manner. The emergent individual explains 
the unified character of both human experiences and mental properties. On 
the one hand, an irreducibly singular entity is produced by a sufficiently 
organized conjunction of areas of the brain, while on the other, that entity 
unifies the emergent mental properties across diverse brain modalities. 
According to Aristotle, the acting self (the active intellect) is ontologically 
distinct from its matter, on the basis both of its irreducibility to that matter 
and of its unifying nature.
Intellect in this sense of it is separable, impassable, unmixed, since it is in its 
essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to the passive factor, 
the originating force to the matter which it forms) (Aristotle 1986, 430a18–20).6
It is the part of the soul responsible for reasoning, known as the active intel-
lect of the soul (nous poietikos) and possibly capable of existing separately 
6 Cf.: Bunnin and Yu 2004, 12; Sellars 1949, 561–562.
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from the body. In this regard, Aristotle makes a terminological distinction 
between soul (psyche) and intellect (mind, nous). Active intellect may survive 
bodily extinction.
We may add here that philosophers working from the manifest image 
are not alone in upholding that experience involves an active unifying 
something (a subject or process). That position is also endorsed by some 
outstanding neuroscientists engaged in the pursuit of a conception of 
persons appropriate to the scientific image.
The results of Benjamin Libet’s experiments have confirmed such 
a hypothesis: the readiness potential (RP, evoked unconsciously in the brain) 
of subjects appears some 500 milliseconds before any reported awareness on 
the part of a person of a random, spontaneous decision to move their finger. 
Libet’s account makes this quite clear in completely empirical terms, but in 
philosophical terms the problems were only beginning. Libet’s research, it 
seems, delivers a scientific-empirical argument to the effect that free will 
is a delusion. But how could we, as unified subjects, reflectively conclude 
about ourselves that we are responsible for decisions which we were not 
aware of until after they had been realised?
For sure, some would have been only too happy to see mental states 
of free will eliminated, but Libet himself was not ready to let them go 
so unproblematically. Although the unified subject’s “decision” to move 
a finger happened in its brain too early on for it to have been initiated by 
a conscious, volitional mental state, there was still—just—a timeframe 
in which conscious awareness might conceivably veto the moving of the 
finger.7 This timeframe lasts, on Libet’s account, no more than about 100 
milliseconds. But is it possible to decide to move at a random moment 
while at the same time holding on to the view that I will not, ultimately, 
carry out the movement? The neuroscientist John-Dylan Haynes—together 
with others—has proposed a kind of experimental proof of the vetoing’s 
occurrence in respect of the acting of a unified subject:
7 For a detailed description of Libet’s experiments, see: Bremer 2013, 194–212.
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To summarize, our results suggest that humans can still cancel or veto a move-
ment even after onset of the RP. This is possible until a point of no return around 
200ms before movement onset. However, even after the onset of the movement, 
it is possible to alter and cancel the movement as it unfolds (Schultze-Kraft et 
al. 2016, 1084).
Libet himself offers a philosophical solution to both the veto-problem and 
the issue of the unified something responsible for conscious decisions. 
However, insofar as his global theory of consciousness is also designed to 
secure the status of both the acting unified subject and his or her free will, 
along with the subjective experience which (in his view) carries it, our free 
decisions must be conscious decisions, and as such these require unified, 
subjective awareness. He thus postulates the existence of a conscious 
mental field (CMF), intended to account for the unity of those varied mental 
phenomena whose unified character would not appear anyway, just as 
a natural consequence of the firing of neurons.
the conscious mental field [CMF JB] theory […] is not dualism, in the Cartesian 
sense; the CMF does not exist without the living brain, and is an emergent 
property that brain (Libet 2003, 28)
Libet believes that the presence of such a field helps us to explain how 
the diverse forms of activity of the brain are bound together into a single, 
unified conscious experience. He does not see this field as a straightforward 
physical phenomenon, but as an emergent entity. Neither does he assume 
that manifest conscious volitional activity is explainable by, or reducible 
to, neuronal activity, although it certainly requires it. Moreover, he does 
not seek to advocate any kind of dualism or spiritual theory: instead he 
has proposed CMF as a strongly emergent phenomenon—as something 
that arises from the combination of active neurons, but which amounts to 
something definitely greater than and different from the mere sum of all 
brain activity involved.
The conscious mental field is conceived, then, as an emergent property 
of brain processing. It exerts an active, unifying and controlling role in 
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shaping the flow patterns of cerebral excitation. These higher-order mental 
patterns have their own subjective qualities and operate according to their 
own causal laws and principles, which are different from and cannot be 
reduced to those of neurophysiology.
Libet seeks to stave off criticism, noting that some may wish to assign his 
position to the dualist camp. Yet he is not one to be frightened off by such 
name-calling. According to him the CMF does not represent the dualism of 
Descartes, who described the mind as a separable substance. But his CMF 
proposal is, of course, highly speculative. Meanwhile, he himself claims not 
to know of any existing evidence that would contradict the proposal, and, 
furthermore, considers it amenable to direct validation via experimental 
testing. 
Libet points to the results of the neuropsychologist Roger Sperry, who 
had likewise proposed that the mind is an emergent property of certain 
appropriate brain functions, equipped with special attributes not evidenced 
by the neural activities occurring within the system that is the brain itself 
(cf. Gazzaniga 2013, 2–3).8 Sperry does clearly hold that mental properties 
have causal force: 
The conscious subjective properties in our present view are interpreted to have 
causal potency in regulating the course of brain events; that is, the mental 
forces or properties exert a regulative control influence in brain physiology 
(Sperry 1976, 165).9
Due to his work with split-brain patients, Sperry initially alighted upon 
the term “interactionism” to describe his findings. Because these patients’ 
corpora callosa had been separated, no neurophysiological account could 
be given of the unified consciousness they continued to manifest in their 
ordinary lives. Thus, Sperry argued, there had to be unified interactions at 
8 “In those efforts, I reviewed neuroscientific data which supports the modular view of 
brain organization, now widely established, along with a possible understanding of why 
our subjective life seems largely unified. … People —even split-brain patients—feel inte-
grated, whole and purposeful, not modularized and multiple” (Gazzaniga 2013, 4–5).
9 Cf. Sperry 1987, 164–166.
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the emergent level of consciousness. This would then involve conscious 
states exercising direct downward causation on subsequent brain states 
(perhaps together with other causal factors). Experiments on split-brain 
phenomena do not appear to furnish any basis for arguing against either 
the hypothesis of strong emergence or the notion of a single unified subject 
with a divided brain. 
In this context, M. Gazzaniga, a student and follower of Sperry, highlights 
a further point:
On the neurophysiological level, we are born with a sense of fairness and some 
other moral intuitions. These intuitions contribute to our moral judgments on 
the behavioral level, and, higher up the chain, our moral judgments contribute 
to the moral and legal laws we construct for our societies. These moral laws 
and legal laws on the societal scale provide feedback that constrains behavior. 
The social pressures on the individual at the behavior level affect his survival 
and reproduction and thus what underlying brain processes are selected for. 
Over time, these social pressures begin to shape who we are. Thus, it is easy to 
see that these moral systems become real and very important to understand 
(Gazzaniga 2011, 186).10
Social pressures (i.e., non-material and non-efficient causes) do de facto 
change behaviour, as is demonstrated by scientific studies carried out in 
relation to various different versions of the scientific image. Persons make 
decisions, and they are formed by societies. Thus, claims to the effect that 
all forms of behaviour are completely controlled by neurological processes 
in the brain are not supported either by our experiences in respect of the 
manifest image, or by what scientific research and explanations have shown 
to be the case.
10 For a comparison between Sperry’s and Gazzaniga’s concepts of emergence, see: Seager 
2012, 227.
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3.2. The unified subject and its formal causal power
“Todo hombre puede ser, si se lo propone, 
escultor de su propio cerebro”.11
Santiago Ramón y Cajal
The unified subject possesses the causal power to affect (organize) the agent’s 
brain, thanks to the latter’s neuroplasticity. Formal causation connected with 
material, and goal-oriented causation, mean that the emergent conscious 
agent has the causal power to organize his or her own brain. Some discoveries 
about the brain’s neuroplasticity support the thesis that the brain is capable 
of acting under the guidance of such a conscious individuum.
The notion of neuroplasticity, the brain’s capacity to change and alter its struc-
ture and function, is particularly relevant to rehabilitation and an understanding 
of both natural and induced recovery processes (Mateer and Bogod 2003, 168).
It is widely acknowledged that after non-progressive brain damage most 
individuals exhibit some degree of recovery of cognitive and behavioural 
functions, and that many make a significant improvement. Healthy brain-ar-
eas and circuits have the ability to assume new functions or roles—ones 
usually performed by the damaged parts. The concept of neuroplasticity 
has come to be used as a broad bridge between the field of neurobiology 
and different kinds of therapy—above all psychotherapy. 
The study of neuroplasticity is an extremely broad field that is investigated at 
multiple levels from molecules, to neural systems, to behaviour. Much of the 
seminal work regarding neuroplasticity has arisen from investigations of the 
somatosensory and motor systems (Merabet, Lotfi and Pascual-Leone 2010, 44).
In other words, our brains are capable of being formed—according to 
Gazzaniga—by the absorption of information from the world, but also by 
conscious subjects themselves. The plasticity of the brain permits conscious 
11 “Every man can, if he so desires, become the sculptor of his own brain” (Llaca-Rodríguez 
and Ramón y Cajal, 202). Santiago Ramón y Cajal is regarded by some as the father of 
modern neuroscience.
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subjects to actively form neural stimuli, and thus to instigate short-term and 
long-term changes to the relevant neural circuits fundamental to human 
actions and to the formation of behaviour, habits and habitual responses 
(Cheung et al. 2014, 6).
Neuroplasticity, understood in these terms, correlates well with the meta-
physical claim underlying Aristotle’s hylomorphic approach to the soul-body 
connection. The neural processes—to which the conscious subject relates—have 
the capability to be managed (i.e., shaped) by this conscious unified subject, 
much as a choirmaster manages (i.e., shapes) the musical ensemble of singers 
into a melodious whole. The subject exerts its (formal) causal influence in order 
to modify (or rewrite) the neural connections of its own brain.
Such subject-directed neuroplasticity means that the subject has a vol-
untary capacity to manage (or organize), through sustained conscious effort, 
the areas of the cerebral cortex, so that new (or even, perhaps, sometimes old) 
forms of behaviour emerge. Subject-directed neuroplasticity essentially uses: 
the power of focused attention along with the ability to apply commitment, 
hard work, and dedication, to direct your choices and actions, thereby rewiring 
your brain to work for you (Schwartz and Gladding 2012, 39).12
Brain neuroplasticity, the stimulation of the growth of neuronal connections, 
and the influence of culture create the social, emergent mind that is 
a hallmark of human beings. This implies that brain organization is more 
important than, for instance, brain height or weight, and that the human 
brain is, contra Descartes, organized in a quite different way from the brains 
of other animals (cf. Gazzaniga 2011, 25).
3.3. Empirical examples of the evidence for subject-directed  
neuroplasticity
1. According to Research Professor of Psychiatry Jeffrey M. Schwartz, 
conventional science has long held the position that “the mind” (or the soul) 
is merely an illusion. According to this view, the mind is an epiphenomenal 
12 Cf. Nahum, Lee and Merzenich 2013, 141–173.
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side effect of electrochemical activity within the physical brain (i.e., an 
effect without any causal powers). Schwartz, though, argues for exactly 
the opposite thesis: that the mind has a life of its own as an independent 
entity that can shape and control the functioning of the physical brain 
(cf. Schwartz and Begley 2002).13
Schwartz proposes a non-materialist interpretation of neuroscience, and 
asserts that such an interpretation is increasingly revealing the limitations 
of the standard reductionist-materialist interpretation. He underpins this 
with the results that he himself has obtained as a specialist working in 
the treatment of—amongst others—patients with obsessive-compulsive 
disorder. Somebody suffering from this disorder recognizes unwanted 
obsessive-compulsive thoughts as such, experiencing the urges that stem 
from them as quite foreign to his or her intrinsic self. Yet such intrusive 
thoughts (the obsession part) do still trigger intense urges to accomplish 
ritualistic forms of behaviour (the compulsive part) (cf. Schwartz and Begley 
2002, 55–56, 80–87, 355). By way of example, we may mention that after 
a few episodes handwashing the compulsive person knows perfectly well that 
his/her hands are clean, and yet still feels compelled to wash them again. 
The visible difference between the obvious truth (the hands are clean) and 
certain irrational, unreasonable doubts (to the effect that they might still be 
dirty) has encouraged Schwartz to examine the philosophical foundations 
of this area of neuroscience. 
Scans of certain brain regions of patients exhibiting obsessive-compul-
sive disorder have led Schwartz to the thesis that these regions are exhibiting 
unusual patterns of activity. Taken by itself, such results are consistent with 
a reductionist-materialist view of mind: after all, materialism implies that 
it is a consequence of the brain making the mind possible that unusual 
patterns of brain activity can be presumed to correlate in a necessary and 
sufficient way with dysfunctional mental states. Nevertheless, having 
found unusual patterns of brain activity, Schwartz has engaged patients 
with obsessive-compulsive disorder in intensive, real mental 4Rs-therapy 
13 Because the book mostly describes Schwartz’s own research and thinking, I will refer just 
to him as the primary author of the book.
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(relabelling, reattributing, refocusing, and revaluing). In the case of com-
pulsive hand-washing cited above as an example, this therapeutic effort 
involved a patient recognizing that his hands were indeed clean (relabelling). 
The urge to wash the hands is seen as not pointing to any reality that 
must actually be acted on. It is crucial that the patient develops a kind 
of mindful attentiveness to this truth, and writing down such truths can 
be extremely helpful, along with attributing fears and doubts about one’s 
hands being dirty to a dysfunctional brain (reattributing), channelling one’s 
reflections and actions away from handwashing and towards profitable goals 
(refocusing), and, finally, comprehending at a deep level the absurdity of 
obsessive-compulsive messages (revaluing). The 5thR comes from the side 
of the brain itself, in the form of a realignment of forms of brain-activity. 
Schwartz has found not only that patients who have attended his 4R-s 
therapy have experienced substantial emancipation from obsessive-com-
pulsive symptoms, but also that their brain neuroimaging scans indicate 
a sustainable reframing of brain-activity patterns. Thus, without any 
interventions (such as would directly affect their brains) either from outside 
(e.g., through transcranial magnetic or transcranial electric stimulation) 
(Bremer 2013, 246–249) or from inside (e.g., through medical drugs), 
obsessive-compulsive patients have proved able to organize their brains by 
deliberately altering their thoughts and behaviours. The significant point for 
Schwartz here is plainly not that modified thoughts and forms of behaviour 
were permanently altering the patterns of a person’s brain activity, but 
rather that such modifications were resulting from, as he calls it, “mindful 
awareness..., that has an activating effect on the brain” (Schwartz and Begley 
2002, 335): i.e., conscious and purposive thoughts or actions in which the 
patient adopts the stance of an uninvolved observer. The therapist’s role 
is to draw the patient’s attention to (i.e., focus it on) aspects of his present 
experience that he might not otherwise notice.
On the basis of such experiments involving therapy, Schwartz argues that 
since the mind can actually change the brain, the mind must be something 
other than the brain: something ideal. He shows that the human mind is 
something autonomous, which can shape and control the functioning of the 
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physical brain. On the one hand, these experiments could be interpreted as 
being entirely consistent with mainstream neurology—the material brain is, 
after all, modifying the material brain. On the other hand, Schwartz’s therapy 
has its basis in our emerging understanding of adult plasticity—it lies in the 
brain’s ability to be radically rewired not just in childhood, but throughout 
life. Yet in this paradigm-shifting work, the author takes neuroplasticity one 
critical step forward. Over the course of years spent medicating patients with 
obsessive-compulsive disorders, Schwartz arrived at an important result: 
while following the 4R-rherapy that he had developed, his patients were 
able to remodel their own neural pathways. Audaciously, he suggests that 
we are more than mere kinetic robots: our physical brain does not shape 
our destiny alone. 
2. The next example of evidence for agent-directed neuroplasticity can be 
found in cases of strokes.
Stroke can be seen as a massive distortion of the capacity of the brain to process 
neural information, with heterogeneous consequences. Not only is the motor 
system affected after a stroke, but also the cognitive and emotional systems 
may be seriously impaired (de Vries and Mulder 2007, 5).
According to de Vries, recent papers indicate that information provided by 
imagining and observing movements might form an additional source of the 
kind information that could be useful for motor rehabilitation after a stroke. 
Meanwhile, one of the first conceptualisations of the imagination comes 
from Aristotle: “The soul never thinks without a mental image [phantasma]” 
(Aristotle 1986, 431a15; cf. Tateo 2015, 1–6). The radical imagination of 
the singular individual is the essential determining element of the human 
psyche. It includes images, memories and hopes. 
It is fascinating to wonder whether, for stroke victims, information 
provided by imagining (motor imagery) and observation may also play 
a role in the process of re-learning motor skills. Motor imagery is the 
mental execution of a movement without any overt movement, or without 
any peripheral (muscle) activation. It has been shown that motor imagery 
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leads to the activation of the same brain areas as the actual movements 
do. The justification behind this assertion is that brain areas normally 
involved in movement planning and execution are also active during the 
imagining of a movement. Most studies of stroke victims combine physical 
and mental practice, and use auditory instructions to guide patients through 
the imagined movements. Patients are encouraged to listen to an audiotape 
instructing them to imagine themselves making functional use of the 
affected limb.
Studies measuring electromyographic (EMG) activity, cortical motor evoked 
potentials, and cerebral blood flow also have shown that the appropriate 
neuromotor pathways imagined as being used are actually being used and 
that metabolic activity of neurons is increased during mental practice as if the 
activity is actually being performed (Page et al. 2001, 1457).
Mental and physical practice at the behest of the individual lead ipso facto 
to neuroplastic changes in the motor cortex area of the brain.
According to Carvalho (et al.), various approaches have been employed 
to investigate post-stroke rehabilitation (Carvalho et al. 2013). It has been 
shown that the human brain is capable of significant recovery after such 
injuries. Among its follow-on effects, hemiparesis (affliction of one half of 
the body: left or right) has been treated with mirror-therapy, from which 
cortical changes have been found to ensue. Mirror therapy is a type of motor 
imagery in which a mirror is used to transfer visual stimuli to the brain 
through observation of one’s uninfluenced body part as it makes a series 
of movements. The underlying principle is that movement of the affected 
limb can be stimulated via visual cues originating from the opposite healthy 
side of the body. On this basis, it is thought that such a form of therapy can 
bring about useful effects in patients who have lost movement of an arm 
or leg, including those who have had a stroke.
In particular, sensorimotor disorders in post-stroke patients during 
the execution or observation of motor action have induced changes to the 
neighbouring cortical semi-shade area. Additionally, motion imagination 
studies have demonstrated efficacies in treating the post-stroke group of 
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patients. In this case, the underlying hypothesis is that “mirror neurons” 
have been activated during such trainings. According to Acharya and Shukla:
Mirror neurons represent a distinctive class of neurons that discharge both when 
an individual executes a motor act and when he observes another individual 
performing the same or a similar motor act (Acharya and Shukla 2012, 118).
Mirror neurons not only fire when we perform a movement, but also when 
someone else executes that movement and we observe their performance. 
As such, they are in line with one of the most striking aspects of our complex 
thought processes: namely, “intention understanding”. This reflects the 
fact that there are two distinct information-based processes one can be on 
the receiving end of when observing an action done by another individual: 
the first concerns our coming to know “what” action is being performed, 
while the second, more complex one concerns our understanding “what 
for” or “why” (i.e., with what intention) the action is being done. There 
has also been speculation about mirror neurons possibly providing the 
neurological basis for human self-awareness. Mirror neurons can not only 
help simulate other people’s behavior, but can also be turned “inward” to 
create second-order representations or meta-representations of one’s own 
earlier brain processes. Ramachandran, for instance, believes that this could 
constitute the neural basis for introspection, and for the reciprocity that 
obtains between self-awareness and other-awareness (Ramachandran 2009).14
Conclusion 
Aristotle is the leading philosopher of the manifest image of the world. 
In his hylomorphic account, the form is the actuality of an object, since 
its occurrence explains why this particular quantity of matter comes to 
14 Nevertheless Ramachandran noticed that: “Neurological conditions have shown that the 
self is not the monolithic entity it believes itself to be. It seems to consist of many com-
ponents each of which can be studied individually, and the notion of one unitary self may 
well be an illusion. (But if so we need to ask how the illusion arises; was it an adaptation 
acquired through natural selection?)” (Ramachandran 2009).
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be that object, in contrast to some other kind of object. Likewise, then, 
the occurrence of the soul explains why this matter is the living matter of 
an individual subject, a human being, as opposed to some other kind of 
object. What is significant here is that this way of construing the integral 
connection between the soul and the body as a special case of form-matter 
relations treats reference to the soul as an integral, inseparable part of any 
complete explanation of a living being, be it in general terms or at the more 
particular level of explanations of human beings. 
Aristotle emphasises the importance of the soul in explanations of living 
beings. Concurrently with this, he considers claims about the separability 
of the soul from the body to be unjustified, and makes first of all an appeal 
to formal causation. Aristotle’s hylomorphism therefore stands somewhere 
in between the theories of reductive materialism and Cartesian dualism.
Returning to the issue of the scientific image, let us recall that we found 
that individual subjects can be treated as emergent entities playing a role 
in unifying emergent mental properties correlated in turn with distinct 
modalities of the brain. The theory of strong emergence has, as a heuristic 
theory, quite general predictive and explanatory power as regards the 
field of human thought and behaviour. The emergent individuals possess 
a causal power to influence their own brains, meaning that thanks to the 
neuroplasticity of the brain, they have the power to organize or configure 
it. As we saw, such individuals are unique entities emerging (in a strongly 
emergent sense) from their brains, and influenced by their cultural sur-
roundings as well.
Studies of neuroplasticity lend credibility to the thesis that individuals 
and their mental properties are not epiphenomenal entities, but rather 
exert an emergent form of downward causation in order to influence their 
own brain functions.
One of the questions we have posed concerns the extent to which the 
heuristic theory of strong emergence might furnish explanations of human 
thinking and behaviour similar in kind to Aristotelian hylomorphic theory. 
According to Aristotle, the occurrence of life marks a sharp ontological 
break in the manifest world. (However, it is worth stressing here that apart 
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from offering a few remarks in passing, our topic of investigation here 
has not really been the role of strong-emergence theory in contemporary 
biology.) As regards the relation between the individual subject and its 
brain, we have come down on the side of the relation of strong emergence. 
As of today, that relation would seem to provide an adequate explanation 
of the connectedness observed to obtain between the manifest-image 
understanding of a person on the one hand, and the subject qua individuum, 
with its brain as the object of scientific investigation, on the other. 
We have also seen that a more definitive outcome stemming from Libet’s 
experiments is the realization that a person can simply choose to perform 
or not perform (i.e., veto) their volitional actions. (His own philosophical 
explanation of this, as we saw, relies on his theory of the unified conscious 
field.)  
Even so, we do need further—conceptual and empirical—research 
to answer the question of whether the unified individual subject in the 
framework of the scientific image should be construed on the basis of the 
model of Aristotelian substance or of Hume’s “bundle theory of the self”—or, 
for example, on the basis of the model of a unified conscious-field theory. 
Cartesian dualism, supplemented with Locke’s account of qualities, 
has become the main philosophical influence on cognitive-neuroscientific 
research, exercising such a role over the course of three centuries and right 
up to the present time. Although cognitive neuroscientists working today 
have largely abandoned substance dualism, they continue to ascribe mental 
attributes to parts of human beings, typically their brains. Such attributions, 
however, are logically flawed or fallacious. 
The Aristotelian concept of soul is preferable to that of Cartesian mind. 
It should therefore be regarded as providing the proper conceptual basis for 
both scientific psychology and the philosophy of mind. What this means is 
that the theoretical framework within which most scientific psychological and 
neurophysiological work is being carried out is—if only implicitly—the meth-
odological successor, in actual fact, of the manifest-image (Aristotelian) one.
Summing up, the core of our argument here for adopting the concept of 
soul (psyche) in place of the notion of mind has been that over the course 
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of time the Cartesian conception of soul came to supplant the Aristotelian 
one in a manner that can be described as pars pro toto: the thinking soul was 
itself identified with the entirety of Aristotelian soul. As a consequence, the 
philosophy and psychology of consciousness, and the neurosciences, have all 
come in essence to amount to sciences deprived of soul in the Aristotelian 
sense. The seeming possibility of explaining the body’s functions, and of 
conceiving of the latter generally, without invoking the concept of soul 
(i.e., treating it as just a mechanical system), doubtless helped foster such 
an outcome.
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